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บทคัดย่อ
"พิการ" เป็นคำท่ีสามารถเป็นอุปสรรคแก่ความเข้าใจได้ เน่ืองจากภาพ
ลวงจากความท่ีเป็นคำสามัญท่ัวไป อันท่ีจริงคำน้ีนับเป็นทางบรรจบของปรัชญา
และการปฏิบัติเน่ืองจากสามารถเข้าใจความหมายได้หลากหลาย ข้ึนอยู่กับกรอบ
แนวคิดทางปรัชญาท่ีขัดแย้งและมีนัยเชิงนโยบายอันแตกต่างกัน ในบรรดากรอบ
แนวคิดเหล่าน้ี ท่ีทรงอิทธิพลได้แก่รูปแบบเชิงการแพทย์และรูปแบบเชิงสังคม
แม้ว่ารูปแบบเชิงสังคมจะเป็นปฏิปักษ์กับรูปแบบเชิงการแพทย์ แต่ก็มีฐานคติแบบ
เดส์การ์ตเช่นเดียวกัน จึงนำสู่การกดข่ีคนพิการไม่น้อยไปกว่ากัน ประเด็นน้ีถูก
เปิดโปงในงานด้านการร้ือโครงสร้างของนักวิชาการสายหลังสมัยใหม่/หลังโครง
สร้างในทุพลภาพศึกษา ดังน้ัน จึงได้นำเสนอกรอบแนวคิดของฟูโกสำหรับการ
ปลดปล่อยผู้พิการ โดยมิให้มีการกดข่ีเป็นผลตามมาด้วยน้ัน เพ่ือให้ง่ายแก่การ
พิจารณา จึงนำเสนอผลการวิจัยผ่านกรณีศึกษาของ เธเรซา ชาน สตรีผู้มีความพิการ
ซ้ำซ้อนท่ีได้รับการบอกเล่าในภาพยนตร์ท่ีได้รับรางวัลเร่ือง “Be With Me”
Abstract
“Disability” is a term that can be very disabling to our comprehen-
sion because of its illusory commonness. Embedded in conflicting philo-
sophical frameworks with different policy implications, it is such an inter-
section of the philosophical and the practical. Most influential among these
frameworks are the medical model and the social model of disability. De-
spite its declared animosity toward the former, the latter shares its Carte-
sian presuppositions and therefore leads to no less oppression of the dis-
abled. This is exposed in the work of deconstruction by later postmodern/
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poststructuralist scholars in disability studies. To liberate the disabled with-
out oppressive side effects, a Foucauldian framework is thus offered as
an alternative. The case study of “Theresa Chan”, a multiple-disabled
woman as portrayed in the award-winning film, “Be With Me”, is herein
used to facilitate the presentation of the research results.
1.  Introduction
Although it seems simple, the term, “disabled” is a complicated
concept whose meaning varies from one philosophical framework to an-
other. And the adoption of one framework over the others has great impli-
cations on social policies. In this research report, the two widely adopted
frameworks are subject to critical analysis, and an alternative framework
developed within the Foucauldian tenet is considered. The case study of
“Theresa Chan”, a multiple-disabled woman as portrayed in the award-
winning film, “Be With Me”, is herein used to provide a common ground
for the analysis.
2.  Theresa Chan
The winner of five international awards, the film “Be With Me”
was inspired by the autobiography of Theresa Chan’. Becoming deaf at
12 and blind at 14 years old, the multiple-disabled lady was in her 60’s at
the time of the film production. She was able to communicate through
word-by-word pronunciation but unable to hear her own voice. She was
once in love, but cancer took her fianceè away. Despite all these tragedies,
she was a perfect human being fully living her life. She devoted herself
teaching disabled students and depended on her own strong self when she
travelled, cooked, exercised and wrote her autobiography.
Apart from Chan, the film features three inter-woven story lines.
In “Meant to Be”, a story is told of an old man incapable of facing the truth
that his wife had departed. Although a shopkeeper, he was a talented
cook. His estranged son, a social worker taking care of Chan, eventually
introduced the old man to her, who cured his distress of departure with
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her autobiography and gentle touch. In another story, “So in Love”, two
teenage girls, Jackie and Sam, developed a romantic intimacy keeping
contact by mean of texting through the Internet and cell phones. The love,
serious and passionate for Jackie, was considered by Sam to be experi-
mentation. Upon finding a new boyfriend, Sam left.
“Finding Love”, is a story of secret love, told about Fatty Koh, a
security guard in a big office building who fell in love with a lady executive.
She was confident, beautiful and stylish, which was quite contrary to the
timid, coward security guard haunted by childhood memories of family
violence. Each day, Koh was obsessed with only three kinds of activities:
Eat, watch the lady, and plan a confession of love. He finally decided to
give the lady a love letter. Yet, he was killed on the way when someone
dropped on him. That person from the sky was the heartbroken Jackie,
who had committed suicide by jumping off a building. The social worker
came in and took care of the surviving girl. It was probable that he would
be a bridge for Jackie to meet with Chan, the life inspirer.
Why is it said above that Chan is a “perfect” human being? The
film communicates this idea through pictures of activities. Chan did every-
thing that other characters did; but not everything that Chan did was done
by each one of the characters. The old man cooked and read; Fatty Koh
ate and wrote a letter; Jackie and Sam went to school, wrote and sent
texts through the internet and cell phones, and enjoyed leisure. Chan did
all these: She cooked and ate, wrote and sent, went to school, and en-
joyed leisure.
There was but one trait that she didn’t share. That was found in
the case of Koh stricken with the memory of his abusing parents. Chan
was different for she was not haunted by the tragic past. It is evident that
Koh was the only character who never touched love no matter whether it
was from his parents, colleagues, the office lady, or even Chan. An objec-
tion may be raised that Koh was not different since he suffered from a
tragic past just like the others. A closer consideration shows that his tragic
past was not due to a broken heart but to ‘injustice’, which can be related
to Chan, for whom the multiple disabilities and the departure of the loved
one can be described as ‘unjust’ fates. Another remarkable feature was
that Koh solely was a ‘taker’, which was portrayed through the scenes of
his eating and also through that in which he was unable to be a ‘giver’, i.e.
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when in an elevator and incapable even to move himself to help a boy
being abused by his father. Koh’s obsession with the past injustice and
inability to be a giver are what prevents him from becoming a perfect
human being.
There is one thing that Chan did while all others didn’t __ Chan
gave. All other characters desired to ‘take’ from someone whereas Chan,
who suffered most, gave love to everyone. In the end before meeting with
Chan, the old shopkeeper cooked for Chan upon the request of his son,
the social worker; and he cooked to his best even though Chan was not
yet ‘somebody’ to him. Just then, the old man became what Chan was -
the one who gave without discrimination. Finally, he met and received
love from Chan, the universal love that inspired, comforted, and gave life
a meaning. More than this, one activity that all characters evidently shared
throughout the film was the travel, which reminded us of samasara. It
seems, on the path of life, only those can find the true happiness who are
self-emancipated from injustice, in quest of love, and offering love.
3.  “Impairment” or “Disability”
The story of Theresa Chan provides an excellent means to under-
stand disability from a philosophical perspective. People can be surprised
if someone says it is more appropriate to say that Chan is ‘impaired’
rather than ‘disabled’. Why? That is because of the assumption that im-
pairment and disability are one and the same. Endorsement and refutation
of this assumption is a key to grasping the debate on the definition of
disability. Those who agree with such identification are thinking within the
philosophical framework of medical model. In Thailand, they usually are
healthcare personnel, social workers, policy makers, and people in gen-
eral. As a result, it can be deemed as the mainstream understanding of
disability. Those who find the above assumption disagreeable support the
social model of disability. They usually are scholars in the field of disability
studies and advocates of the rights of people with disabilities.
The social model has not yet been mainstream __ not only in Thai-
land, where it was recently introduced, but also in the West, especially the
USA, where the disability rights advocates declared the victory of the
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social model in 1990 when the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
was enacted. The reason is that progress in bio-medical science and tech-
nology (e.g. cloning, genetic selection, advanced prosthetics, etc.) carries
with it the presupposition that disabilities are physical, including the impli-
cation of discrimination against disability and the determination to elimi-
nate them.
Impairment is a kind of bodily defects, formal and/or functional.
Disability is an inability to perform daily, social and occupational activities
as normal people do. According to the medical model, the disability is a
natural consequence of the impairment. Therefore, for people with im-
pairments, disabilities are inevitable, and this holds true in every social
context. However, Michael Oliver, who first introduced the philosophical
framework of the social model, challenged this idea by arguing that dis-
ablement doesn’t result from physical impairments, but from social ar-
rangements. That is, people with impairments are ‘dis-abled’ by social
institutions. Therefore, the disablement is the result of social oppression.
In other word, people with impairments are not dis-abled in the just soci-
ety.
The term, ‘oppression’, is used because, according to the social
model, the society does not pay attention to the needs of impaired people
and draws the resources that should be allocated to meet these needs to
benefit the majority of people who do not suffer from impairments. The
new definition of disability inaugurated by Oliver is welcomed even by
normal people because it draws attention to the fact that all of us can
somehow be dis-abled when the social arrangements are not suitable.
Different situations testify to this insight e.g. tourists who cannot under-
stand language on street signs, young boys who cannot use relatively too
high a urinal, children who cannot reach a public telephone, pregnant
women and elderly people who cannot climb up stairs.
The social model can free disabled people from various, espe-
cially emotional, impacts from the medical model, within which the goal is
to change them to be like normal people. The latter model is embedded in
the Cartesian dualistic framework, which separates mind from body. The
human self is identified with the mind that should be under the control of
reason. The body, in which the mind resides, is just one among other
physical objects in the world and thus subject to the external control, the
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natural laws. According to this framework, the mind should be in control
of the body the way Science controls the natural world.
As for people with impairments, their mind seems to fail to control
their body. Many succumb to grief over their own fate, fail in rehabilita-
tion, and give up their efforts. These are signs that they do not meet the
standard of what it is to be a human being. The other side of the same coin
is the appreciation given to those impaired persons who never grieve over
their own fate, succeed in their rehabilitation, and never give up despite
failures. Both derision and admiration confirms the Cartesian framework,
which even leads the impaired people to blame and punish themselves.
The advocates of the social model consider it to be unjust the
expectation to change the impaired people so that they have the charac-
teristics of the ‘human beings’ as defined by the Cartesian framework.
Many kinds of impairments defy rehabilitation, which means that many
impaired people are cursed to always fail. According to the social model,
instead of the impaired people themselves, the spotlight should be on the
society. Indeed, people with impairments are not ‘the losers’ but ‘the op-
pressed’. The shift of perspective greatly restores impaired people’s self-
esteem and encourages them to fight against the oppression. Eventually,
the social model becomes highly influential among disability rights advo-
cates and scholars in the disability studies.
4.  “Impairment” in “Disability”
However, deconstruction by the later postmodern/poststructuralist
scholars in the disability studies discloses that, in fact, the social model
supports the medical model. Therefore, this makes it not a surprise the
above example from the USA, in which the admiration for the successful
campaign for the ADA is side by side with the dismay caused by the
scientific and technological progress. The attempt of those working on the
basis of the social model to turn the dis-abled into the able __ so that they
are just like the normal __ is the clear sign that, in the social model, the
same goal as found in the medical model is present __ to change impaired
persons to be like normal persons. This is to use ‘the normal person’ as
‘the norm’, which can be termed, ‘normalization’. Moreover, the Carte-
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sian idea of ‘mind over matter’ is also present. A difference is that, as for
the social model, ‘matter’ is understood as the physical environment and
social arrangements, rather than the body as it is the case in the medical
model.
Consequences from the medical and the social models are there-
fore similar. In the context of new and ‘enabling’ infrastructure acquired
through campaigns based on the social model, any disabled people who
fail in rehabilitation are subject to emotional pressure and humiliation, and
labeled as ‘losers’ and ‘burdens’ by their kind, normal people who ‘pay
the tax’, and the state who provides the welfare system, which leads to
similar experience they undergo in the framework of medical model i.e.
self-blame and self-punishment. Moreover, the social model lends sup-
port to the medical model in another dimension through its implicit reitera-
tion of the idea that the impairment cannot be separated from the disable-
ment.
Even though the social model’s definition of disability helps people
to realize that dis-ability is common experience, none at all call them
‘people with disabilities’ those normal people who are dis-abled by the
infrastructure. This is an indirect confirmation that the term, ‘disabled’, is
specifically for the impaired people. Therefore, both the medical and the
social models do not only highlight the presence of impairment, but also
insist that they belong to the natural, not social, realm.
Postmodern/post-structuralist scholars in the disabilities studies,
especially those influenced by Michel Foucault, question the idea of ‘mind
over matter’ and that of impairment as belonging to the realm of nature.
They argue that the mind is actually constituted by an external condition
i.e. discourse that constructs reality and deploys both the material (e.g.
the body, objects, spaces) and the mental (e.g. self-identity) in such a way
that they are in agreement with the constructed reality. The important point
is that ‘normality’ as a discursive construct provides a criterion for con-
structing ‘abnormality’, which includes ‘impairment’. The discursive power
drives the process of normalization with the effort to turn the abnormal
into the normal. Therefore, the true oppression stems from ‘the good will’
to help impaired people to be normal or close to normality no matter
whether it is understood in terms of ‘normal body’ (in the medical model)
or of ‘normal way of life’ (in the social model).
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Why is the normalization considered to be a form, or even the
origin of all forms, of oppression? In the West, it is disclosed that the
model of normal human being is the white, heterosexual, and able-bodied
male. Based on this model of normality, abnormality is constructed. Of
course, those who fall into this category are homosexuals, non-whites,
women, and impaired persons. This provides a justification for subjecting
them to the process of normalization. However, since they will never fit
the normal model, the process continues forever. Therefore, it is not un-
reasonable to deem oppressive the constant effort to change people into
something they can never be.
Power has both repressive and productive dimensions. For the
discursive power to operate, targeting mechanisms are needed. They are
based on categorization which individualizes people. Each individualized
person is given an identity, the intersection of categories to which she
belongs. Identity is therefore nothing more than the categories that define
an individual. There is no self over and above these categories. Therefore,
according to Foucault, the individual as the discursive product can be
understood as the ‘subject’, who is not only ‘subject to’ the discursive
power, but also has ‘subjectivity’ defined by that power.
In addition, normalization is not only exercised from without but
also from within; the external and the internal are both constructed by and
subject to the same totalizing discourses. In self-surveillance, individuals
observe and discipline themselves as if they were in a panopticon, a kind
of prison proposed by Jeremy Bentham. Foucault offered it as the model
for understanding self-surveillance. In the panopticon, illuminated prison
cells form a ring around a central tower of guards that is kept out of light.
Since they can never be sure whether the guards are around in the tower
and since they are well aware of their own visibility, the prisoners have to
always behave as if they are being watched. Eventually, they become the
guards to themselves. From this, it can be seen that individuals unknow-
ingly are representatives of power despite their sense of self-agency. More
than that, apart from themselves, they act as the agent of power to con-
trol, or normalize, others.
The true horror of oppression is therefore not in its repressive
violence, but in the subjectification and agency of power. For instance,
when women’s beauty is defined with thinness, it is the women who play
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the active roles in observing and ‘disciplining’ themselves (e.g. through
diet, exercise, weight-losing pills) in order to meet the beauty criterion.
Likewise, among different mechanisms, including social work and reha-
bilitation that produce and maintain the understanding that impaired people
are the disabled, one can find those mobilized by disability rights advo-
cates and people with impairments.
The Foucauldian framework enables one to see that the ‘good
will’ of the social model is not different from that of the medical model in
that it too supports oppression. The philosophical framework of the social
model implicitly maintains that impairment belongs to the natural realm. At
the same time, it approves the bio-medical scientific categorization of body
and impairments, the knowledge of which is necessary for implementation
of welfare policies. Moreover, as the social model advocates launch cam-
paigns to urge the government to provide different welfare systems to
support people with impairments, they encourage development of more
meticulous and detailed systems of categorization that are needed for in-
dividualizing impaired people in the process to select ‘appropriate’ wel-
fare recipients. And the acquired supportive systems put pressure on im-
paired people with the expectation that they succeed in living a normal life.
However, if it is true as Foucault pointed out that reality is discur-
sively constructed so that human self does not even exist, it seems none
can deal with the oppressive power. A question that follows is how the
oppressed can be emancipated.
5.  Neither “Impaired” nor “Disabled”
The above Foucauldian ideas belong to the earlier period, which
rest on the two poles of ‘power’ and ‘knowledge’ (i.e. categorization).
These cannot be separated and thus are referred to as ‘power/knowl-
edge’. As for the later period, Foucault introduced another pole, ‘self’,
whose existence seems to be denied by his earlier thought. The later Fou-
cault studied about the ancient Greeks and found that people then fo-
cused on stylizing their self to make it beautiful like a work of art. In this
process, they took care of the self through self-reflection based on the
norms defined by power/knowledge, and through self-formation based
76 Prajna Vihara~
on that reflection. Therefore, Foucault sees that, before power and knowl-
edge can create the subject, they must interact with the self.
Usually, the self is passive letting power/knowledge to mold the
subject. As shown in the above example, women let power/knowledge to
construct their subjectivity and consequently try in every way to keep thin.
Processes in the society that lead to these women’s subjectivity and con-
tribute to their weight-keeping efforts are called, ‘technologies of power’,
which include ridicule of ‘fat’ women, skinny models on magazine covers,
weight-control clinics, etc. However, the Greek lesson shows that the self
can have an active role. Although it still relies on power/knowledge and
technologies of power, it transforms them into ‘technologies of the self’.
The starting point, according to Foucault, is the criticality known
as ‘limit attitude’, which is to be in quest of the limits of our being, doing,
or thinking. In other words, it is to search for possibilities of not being,
doing, or thinking as we are. When the limit is discovered, one can start to
form one’s self in a way different from that within the limit constructed by
discourse. The product of the quest is an understanding about the kind of
subject formed by the discourse through the technologies of power. This
understanding includes the rationality that legitimizes the discourse.
The understanding is vital because, if lacking, the emancipatory
activities will instead become oppressive. For instance, in their resistance
to sexual oppression, if women does not take into account the rationality
that provides the basis for the oppressive practice and struggle against it
by way of doing everything opposite to those prescribed by society, they
eventually lend support to what they are against. Some women wear re-
vealing clothes or are sexually liberal to rebel against the social prescrip-
tions. Unknowingly, these support the rationality for women’s subjugation
because they are raised as evidence to confirm that women lack con-
science and self-control on the one hand, and that they are sex objects on
the other hand. The resisted discourse is thus strengthened, rather than
challenged.
The critical attitude, which initiates self-formation through tech-
nologies of the self, needs to be maintained. It is analogous to an artist
who has to keep critically assessing her own work while in the creative
process. Therefore, Foucault called this constant care of the self, ‘aes-
thetics of existence’. His concept of ethics plays an important role in this
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resistance through self-formation. According to Foucault, ‘morality’ pre-
scribes the sort of subject that discourse aims to mold while ‘ethics’ is
how a person relates to morality. Ethics is therefore the way to negotiate
with morality.
Foucault saw that the former was the practice of the ancient Greeks
while the latter belonged to the modern period. Even though prescriptions
of conduct existed in the time of Greeks, the focus was on individuals’
styles, interpretations of these prescriptions. Individuals during that time
were therefore free to a certain extent in their decision of how to relate to
the norms. Ethics is thus a resource for the ‘ethics of existence’, affirma-
tion of freedom through self-formation. However, in the modern time, the
focus shifted from individuals’ styles to the prescriptions themselves, which
deprived individuals of interpretive liberty. The social norms thus demanded,
with punitive threats, strict observance. A return to the Greek way was
urged in order to change from the passive attitude of subjectification to the
active attitude of self-formation.
According to Foucault, the ethical practices comprise the follow-
ing four elements.
1. Ontology or ethical substance: It constitutes an ethical con-
cern. For example, as for the ancient Greeks, their concern was ‘aphrodi-
siac’, the practices of sexuality; as for Christians, their concern was the
spirit; as for people with impairments, their concern is the body.
2. Deontology or mode of subjection: This is how one relates to
the ethical substance. For instance, the ancient Greek individuals’ care of
the substance was voluntary. As for the Christians and the impaired people,
the relation to the ethical substances is in the form of obligation.
3. Ascetics or elaboration of ethical work: Ascetic are those ac-
tivities and methods utilized to become the subject as desired. The ancient
Greeks’ ascetics is stylization e.g. through gymnastics. Christian ascetic
practice is self-discipline e.g. by way of self-confession. Likewise, the
impaired people elaborate their ethical work through self-discipline e.g.
rehabilitation.
4. Telos: It is the goal of subjectification, the kind of subject to
create. The ancient Greeks aimed at self-mastery; the Christians’ goal
was to become without sins; the impaired people want to be normal or
able.
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Based on understanding of the exiting ontology and telos, resis-
tance is carried on with voluntary deontology. The ascetics is thereby
separated from the ‘telos’ and attached to a new one. Therefore, a person
can benefit from the technologies for ascetic practice by subjecting them
to the new telos. In case of people with impairments, they need to resist
by abandoning the telos to be like normal people while using the available
technologies (e.g. medicine, rehabilitation, social welfare, NGO’s, etc.) to
serve a new telos. Then, they can attain freedom or autonomy.
Autonomy is usually understood as absolute freedom. However,
the above does not lead to such freedom. The resistant are still bound to
their contexts. Actually, the quest for autonomy is possible in the contexts
whose possibilities are structured by power, especially its technologies.
This is not to say that the achieved autonomy is not true because, accord-
ing to Foucault, autonomy is intertwined with heteronomy. This was clear
in time of the ancient Greeks when a method to take care of the self was
to seek a teacher. Through earlier dependency on teachers, students were
later able to depend on themselves.
Even though the resistance as freedom seems to be personal, it
implies relationship with others. The separation of telos from ascetics is a
challenge to the discourse that unifies them. Thereby, both the categoriza-
tion and the rationality are disturbed. In addition, the resistance to the
discursive power is a fight against normalization, which reaches everyone.
At the same time, Foucault encouraged friendship as the mode of relating
to others which, because of its requirement to accept others as they are,
presupposes differences between the parties and prevents one from being
an agent of normalizing power. This kind of relationship therefore allows
others to form their selves.
However, this is not easy. Because power is to make others do
what one wants and people inevitably wants others to do as they want, it
is impossible to be free of power. Foucault consequently proposed a prin-
ciple of minimal domination. He also defined friendship as a ‘way of life’,
which can be shared among people with differences. In other words, ‘a
way of life’ is characterized by its not being institutionalized, which means
that it does not have norms that can easily lead to normalization. As is
shown above, the social model leads to new forms of oppression because
it fell victim to the institutionalization. The ‘way of life’ is in agreement with
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the process of self-formation, the aesthetics of existence carried out through-
out life.
An escape from the totalizing discourse, self-creation is not easy
because the telos and ascetics are not easy to identify; the rationality un-
derlying the discourse is not easy to analyze. And, even though the ratio-
nality is recognized, it is not easy to overcome because our understanding
of reality is conditioned by it. These do not only lead to a failure of resis-
tance but also transform the resistance into an ally. Moreover, even when
the legitimizing rationality is disclosed, it is not possible to imagine a resis-
tance as a collective movement (e.g. by the impaired people) since this
will eventually lead to institutionalization that starts another cycle of nor-
malization.
A good example is the authors’ direct experience when this re-
search was presented in a conference. A debate started among the audi-
ences about terms that should be used to address people with impair-
ments. Their common goal was to find a term that did not imply the nor-
mal/abnormal distinction for fear that, if otherwise, it might lead to dis-
criminations. From the Foucauldian perspective, since the new term func-
tions to remind people of the normal/abnormal distinction and thereby
maintain the foundation of discrimination, such goal should be relinquished.
However, if so, people who still need to talk about people with impair-
ments have to use the terms that are widely used in the society and func-
tioning in the normalization process. Therefore, from this example, it can
be seen that the totalizing discourse can deploy both the new and the old
terms to support itself.
Consequently, although according to the above arguments, the
Foucauldian framework is superior to those of the medical and the social
model in the effort to understand the nature of impairment and disability,
its application is not clear and is still a topic of debates among scholars
who adopted the later Foucault’s ideas in the fields of disabilities studies,
women’s studies, education, organization theory, sociology of sport, etc.
One of the difficulties stems from the attempts to discover resistance meth-
ods for use in the collective level. The generalized solutions are open to
discursive deployment as shown in the above example. Moreover, Fou-
cault himself seemed to suggest that one should avoid acting as a repre-
sentative for a collectivity for it may lead to a normalizing attitude. There-
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fore, the best way to apply the Foucauldian framework is by way of case
studies to understand individuality. Yet, it should be careful not to utilize
the study results as models for other cases in such a way that normaliza-
tion follows. The case studies should give inspiration to individuals in their
self-formation.
While it is not clear, in an individual’s care for their self, what
should be chosen as a new telos and how the technologies should be
diverted to serve self-formation, it is clear how we individuals should treat
others. We should let them be. Thus, impaired people should not be sub-
ject to rehabilitating processes so that they show as much as possible
appearances and abilities akin to those of normal people. In other word,
to let them live with the kind of bodies they have is a form of friendship.
For instance, instead of inconvenient artificial legs, an impaired person
should be allowed to use a roller board or even move on the ground with
hands if that suits the person’s desire. People should not impose their
opinion that, since such choices look demeaning, the person should walk
on legs like normal people. Although it seems easy to open space for
people to choose their telos and transform the technologies of power into
technologies of the self, one complication that one should bear in mind is
that this should be based on understanding of the legitimizing rationality.
5.  Theresa Chan and Michel Foucault
Theresa Chan’s story is best understood within the Foucauldian
framework. From the Foucauldian perspective of ethical practices, Chan’s
ethical substance seems to be love rather than the body as prescribed by
the discourse of disabilities. To serve her telos of non-discriminate giving,
Chan made use of the available technologies e.g. Braille, typewriter, edu-
cation, residence and occupation provided by social welfares. Superfi-
cially, she seemed to be one among those disabled people who subject
themselves to normalization through these technologies. However, a closer
consideration shows that, despite her perfect abilities to live like a normal
person, she went beyond that by applying these abilities to serve others.
She wrote the inspiring autobiography, taught students with disabilities,
gave warm comfort to suffering persons. To sum up, her ascetics is to help
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people.
Why the Foucauldian framework? It seems the medical and the
social models suffice for understanding Chan. Can we say that Chan
achieved the goal of the medical model i.e. had an appearance and physi-
cal functioning enjoyed by normal people? It is not so. Although, looking
like other elderly ladies, she did not have a problem with her appearance,
the functioning of her eyes and ears could never be restored. Yet, from the
rehabilitative perspective derived from the medical model, she was con-
sidered to achieve the goal never to surrender to physical limitations. How-
ever, this is not sufficient to understand Chan’s story. Since the medical
model focuses on the body and its functioning, it aims at a personal victory
over her own body.
In addition, there was a scene in which Chan was swimming and
a lady beside the pool could not hold her laughter. This too highlights the
failure of the medical model whose goal is to fit people into the model of
ideal human being i.e. the ‘normal’ person. Even though Chan was able to
perform normal people’s activities, her impairments __ the mark of abnor-
mality __ were still present. The laughter lends support to the idea held by
the social model that the society oppresses people with disabilities and
therefore highlights the motive to struggle against the social prejudices and
achieve facilities that give abilities to the presently dis-abled people. Push-
ing for reforms of infrastructure and social welfares for people with dis-
abilities, the social model emphasizes a victory over the society. The film
portrayed Chan as the one who enjoyed this kind of victory while the
roles of medical technology and physical therapy were not present.
However, it is undeniable that, no matter how many facilities are
won, the laughter remains if the sole aim is for the impaired people to
become like normal people. May be, the social model implicitly enjoys
such laughter because it helps maintain the rationale for campaigning.
Moreover, since the social model focuses on abilities, it can be said that
people with impairments can be superior to normal people if the former
has better abilities. This kind of superiority was not portrayed in the film at
all. Chan performed ordinary activities i.e. ate, cooked, read, wrote, cleaned
her place, travelled, etc. More than that, Chan lacked the attitude re-
quired by the social model. Unlike Fatty Koh, Chan was never obsessed
with injustice. This was reiterated in the above scene in which Chan was
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totally untouched by the laughter.
Knowing that people in general felt that disabilities were pathetic,
Chan wrote the autobiography of the life with multiple disabilities to in-
spire readers. This shows that, while Chan depends on others, she de-
pends on herself. While the society defined her with impairments, she
utilized that definition to serve her telos. This was in contrast to other
characters who, despite their apparent autonomy, depended on others so
much that they could not live their life when the people that they were
attached to left them. Chan did everything the other characters did but not
with the same goal. Her autonomy provides the reason for adopting the
Foucauldian framework to understand her story. On the other hand, it is
now evident that the case of Theresa Chan can facilitate an understanding
of the Foucauldian framework.
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